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Acrimonious relationship between Japan and South Korea is, sadly, a familiar facet
of international life in Northeast Asia.  Mutual mudslinging over the issue of the “past”
casts a dark shadow over what would otherwise be a mutually beneficial relationship.
Within this intersubjective background, it is tempting to dismiss acrimony as inevitable,
given the frequency with which bilateral relations plunge into an exchange of
invectives across the Tsushima straits.  Sensitive relationship between the two
constitutes a “vexing anomaly” in which people sharing many similarities —— political,
social, and cultural —— are incapable of fully appreciating each other’s existence.  As
Victor Cha states, “[t]he Japan-ROK relationship has been marked by highly volatile
behavior throughout its postwar history,” 1) a clear hangover from the bitter experiences
of the prewar decades —— for South Korea in particular, but for Japan to a lesser extent
as well.
The acrimony that haunts Japan and South Korea in the postwar era partly derives
from a historically constructed Japanese identity.  A long and complex legacy of
Japan’s struggle with external forces has nurtured a myth of Japanese uniqueness that
sets itself apart from the West, as well as from Asia.  The result elevates Japanese sense
of Being on to a pedestal, with the unwelcome consequence of condescension towards
the rest of Asia.  Japan’s hierarchicalized worldview historically represented Korea (and
the Koreans) as subordinate to Japan (and the Japanese).  This image of Korean
Otherness has been emerging throughout the centuries, with the process continuing
well after the Meiji Restoration.  Such narratives were reiterated during Japan’s rapid
modernization in the aftermath of the Restoration; and the nation’s subsequent rise to
Great Power status bolstered Tokyo’s confidence on the international stage.  This
confidence elaborated on the extant sense of Japanese exceptionalism, with its ultimate
“perversion” appearing in the form of Greater Far East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere
and a forlorn justification for the subjugation of Asia in the name of “liberation.” 2)
To be sure, suggesting that the Japanese condescension of its most immediate
neighbor is a historical construct does not imply the sameness of quality throughout the
decades. On the contrary, the evolving international environment, as well as domestic
factors, contribute toward the temporal particularities of any given intersubjective
structure.  If contemporary contexts are evenements unique to an era, the undertones
reverberating throughout the centuries depict la longue durée of Japanese-Korean
relations and the larger context within which the two societies interact with one
another.  As such, one way to appreciate the present context —— and also to understand
the inherent Japanese mode of identity representation —— it is worthwhile revisiting the
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emergence and elaboration 3) of the discourses of liberationism and the attendant
condescension towards the Korean Other that defined the way Japan annexed Korea in
the name of Asian security.  This pan-Asianism is none other than the representation of
Japanese Self being called upon to provide “salvation” from the purported barbarism of
the West.  Herein lies the root of acrimony afflicting Japan’s Asia policy for the decades
to come.
I utilize the intersection of International Relations (IR) with Social Theoretic
methodology in an effort at recasting the initial stages of Japanese imperialism.  Identity
of Self is always constructed in opposition to the Other, and it is represented through
narratives in the form of speech acts.4) Speech acts, being the “production of the token in
the performance” of expressing meanings 5) —— and in this article, the Japanese sense of
Self —— is relevant in recasting Japan’s prewar international experience as a phenomena
not simply dictated through exogenously-given interests, but also deriving from how
the policy elites understood the international environment.  Thus, we can reconsider
Japanese Self as constructed in opposition to Tokyo’s perception of the external
environment, along with Korea as a potential conduit for western colonizers to invade
Japan.  In short, Japanese Self stood in opposition to Korean Otherness as an object
needing to be tamed and disciplined.
This article is divided into three sections.  The first section analyzes prewar Japanese
identity construction, and how it contributed to the emergence of a particular
worldview defined through “pan-Asianism” and “Asian Liberationism.”  I start my
historical analysis on the eve of the Kanghwa Incident of 1875, when Japan considered
Korea to be a buffer against perceived threats from the continent.  The ensuing decades
represented Japan’s efforts at fully realizing its sense of Self as distinct from both the
West and Asia, a process illustrated through the slow, but steady, erosion of Korean
sovereignty.  In the second section, I discuss early interactions between Japan and
Korea in the 1870s, by looking at how the Meiji oligarchs rediscovered Korea.  The
third section discusses how Tokyo’s gradual liquidation of Korean sovereignty between
1876 and 1910 was conducted in the name of Asian security.
Throughout this article, I focus on the narratives of Japanese sense of Self.  As such,
I do not treat Japan as an uncontested entity.  Rather, the term “Japan” is used as a
signifier of dominant discourse at the time of Japan’s adventures into the Korean
peninsula.  Inherent in the dominant discourse was the self-professed superiority of
Japan’s efforts and justification at disciplining the Korean Other.  In the aggregate,
these sections trace the trajectory of the emergence and elaboration of Japanese
liberationism, and in turn seek to show that the practice was underpinned by a
discursive agency of Japanese identity representation.  The aim of this article, therefore,
is not a new history of Japan’s annexation of Korea, but rather, a re-reading of this
particular juncture in Japanese history, to recast this juncture in Japan’s international
experience as a speech act manifestation of its identity representation.  Therefore, this
article is an attempt at a concise discourse analysis of the period between the Meiji
Restoration and the Annexation of Korea.  In short, imperialism was tantamount to a
performative reconstruction of Japan’s Self, albeit with disastrous consequences.
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Korean Expansion as Japanese Speech Act
It is tempting to paint Japan’s prewar identity as solely militarist in the sense that it
was single-mindedly determined to subjugate its neighbors —— China and Korea in
particular —— for the ultimate goal of Asian domination.  A superficial review of the
atrocities committed suggests that the sufferings of millions of Asians at the hands of
Japanese colonizers hint at Japan’s sheer disregard for the well being of Asians —— its
spite for their existence.  Yet, this view alone is unhelpful.  While Japan’s prewar
ambitions did result in disaster, untangling the discourse of Japanese elites since the
Meiji Restoration suggests Japan had different intentions in mind.  Indeed, if we
consider Japan’s Asian Liberationism or pan-Asianism to be its speech act,6) the
worldview shared among Japanese policy makers constitutes a particular “realm of
possibilities” 7) representing the collective identity shared among them.  If Korean
expansion is treated as Japan’s discursive representation of its identity, then it is
possible to recast the ensuing struggles and counter-struggles as unintended
consequence of intended actions: in other words, Japanese colonialism was a premature
and ill-thought out pursuit of heroism gone terribly wrong.
Collective Japanese identity is a historical and discursive construct.  It is constructed
in relation to both exogenous and endogenous factors to which Japan was exposed: the
former being Japan’s geographical position and the associated international
environment; and the latter deriving from reconstitution of a series of narratives
purporting to distinguish Japan from the “West” as well as rest of “Asia.”  Exogenously,
Japan’s physical location in Northeast Asia adjacent to the Korean peninsula meant
that it was vulnerable to attack.8) Also, the prospect of China being devoured by
western powers suggested to Meiji oligarchs that preventive diplomacy needed to be
instituted in order to guarantee Japanese autonomy.  In other words, prime concern
among policy elites was the potentials for the domino effect of colonization reaching
Japanese shores.  Endogenously, the narrative construction of “Japan in Asia” steadily
eroded the notion of Japan as an Asian nation, and instead, instilled the belief that
Japan possessed unique characteristics, being neither a western, nor Asian, entity.9) Put
differently, the centuries-old attempt at reaffirming its distinction from the Beijing court
was given further boost as Japanese elites saw China’s independence wither away by
the middle of the 19 th century.  From this emerged the dominant discourse of Japanese
exceptionalism in its unique capability to ward off westerners, and at the same time, to
avoid the fate of Asia —— a prosaic object of subjugation —— befalling on itself.10)
Thus, the prewar construction of Japanese identity derives from the emergence of a
particular sense of Japanese Being which defined the nation to be neither the West, nor
Asian, but rather, a unique entity endowed with divine blessing, as manifested through
kokutai ideology.11) It is also a product of elaboration, taking its cue from both internal,
as well as external, factors surrounding Japan at the time of Meiji Restoration: the need
to consolidate power domestically, as well as externally, in the country’s pursuit to
rapidly modernize itself.  To be sure, it was in Japan’s national interest at the time to
repeal unequal treaties —— a process seen as tantamount to the country’s exit from Asia
and its power-political identification with the West.12) At the same time, however, the
constraints of the international environment fused with the necessity for autonomy to
construct a realm of possibility for Japan to produce a “sentence token” 13) representing
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its sense of Self in relation to perceived external threats.  It is as if the political necessity
to reaffirm autonomy had converged with the extant narratives of kokutai to concoct an
idea of Japanese mission to “liberate” Asia.14) This newly emergent “realm of
possibility” had acquired a life of its own, being reified into an incontestable concept
within which the cognitive milieu of subsequent policy makers was congealed.15)
This is the intersubjective context within which Japanese gaze turned on Korea.  Just
when western encroachment on China became inevitable, Korea’s independence, and
consequently Japan’s autonomy, became a pressing issue.  Meiji oligarchs realized from
the earliest days that the fate of Korean peninsula would determine Japan’s survival.16)
The perceived threat to Korean survival and Japanese self-preservation turned Korea
into an object of desire for Japanese elites.  Put differently, policy makers’ sense of
exceptionalism, and the concomitant condescension towards Koreans, was translated
into Tokyo’s sense of “obligation” towards its neighbor to help maintain security in
Northeast Asia.17) If this was the intended action, then the outcome in the form of
expansion, annexation, and subjugation, was the unintended consequence.
Throughout the ensuing process, Korea transgressed from an object of desire into an
entity needing to be tamed and disciplined, eventually becoming an imperial subject ——
a mere tool for the preservation of kokutai.  Hence, Japan’s experience on the Korean
peninsula represented a speech act of identity representation in which the barbaric and
backward Korean Other 18) was justifiably —— in the eyes of Japanese elites ——
disciplined and tamed for the benefit of liberationist Japan.  This, they thought, was the
only way to ward off the West and protect Asia’s moral and spiritual integrity.  The
gradual process of Korean annexation can thus be re-read as policy elites’ performative
reconstruction of Japanese identity, whose perception-gap between reality of the
international environment and dream comes back to haunt Japan in the postwar
years.19)
Rediscovering the Korean Other
Rediscovery of the Korean “otherness” has been a continual process predating the
Meiji Restoration —— a time scope that is beyond the remit of this article.  A symbolic
disjuncture came in the seventh century when Japan, unlike Korea, ceased kowtowing to
Chinese courts in an apparent bid to proclaim autonomy from the Chinese sphere of
influence, an effort at reaffirming Japan’s purported divine exceptionalism.  Centuries
later, exceptionalism, coupled with the strategic need to maintain independence after
seeing China fall into the hands of western powers, provided a double-movement: on
the one hand, Japan was inevitably Asian in its geographical disposition; but a the same
time, Japan sought to distance itself from Asia upon witnessing China being eaten alive
by barbarians.  In other words, this double-movement provided a new impetus for the
reconstruction of Japan’s superiority complex.  Such identity reconstruction
encouraged Japanese elites to cast a contemptuous gaze over Korea which remained
under Chinese suzerainty —— evidence enough in the eyes of Meiji oligarchs, that Korea
remained firmly within backward Asia, and in order for Japan to dissociate itself from
the ravages afflicting Asia, they saw no choice, but to promote Japan’s own influence
over Korea.20)
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A Myth of Divinity
Kaikoku after 1854 meant exposing Japan to international society and the realpolitik
of colonialism.  As Maruyama Masao notes, kaikoku inevitably made Japan vulnerable
to predation by western powers, and the Meiji government saw no choice but to
embark upon its own program of continental expansion in an effort at securing
autonomy.21) A Foreign Ministry official, Yanaiba Sakimitsu, recognized this
vulnerability immediately following the Restoration, prompting him to circulate a
memorandum on 28 July 1870 urging that,
Japan’s geographical position surrounded by sea makes its defense extremely
difficult.  The only way through which we can secure survival, therefore, is to
expand into Korea and Manchuria [now that] the European and American
expansion into Asia seems inevitable.22)
It was a representation of a shared realization that the Meiji leaders realized from the
earliest stages of kaikoku that Korea was a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.23)
To be sure, this perceived threat was nothing new.  Generations of Japanese rulers
felt vulnerable since the failed Mongol invasion of the late-thirteenth century.  George
Alexander Lensen points out that
The Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, though ultimately defeated by
storm, left a lasting mark on Japanese thinking that natural forces had come to
their aid both times gave the Japanese confidence and confirmed the traditional
belief that theirs was a sacred land.  That the onslaught had come by way of Korea
instilled in the Japanese perennial fear that the peninsula might again become a
springboard of attack against them.24)
Kamikaze evoked within Japanese policy elites a sense of divine protection for Japan ——
a unique quality enjoyed by no other nation.  This divine confidence fused with the
image of Korean Other as symbolising Japan’s vulnerability, adding momentum to the
construction of a unique Japanese Self that eventually legitimized continental
expansion by the 1870s.  Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s failed campaign of 1592 became a
legend upon which the “heroic” accounts of Japanese warriors were elaborated into a
national myth which gave further momentum for the elaboration of Japanese
condescension towards Korea.25) It was a platform upon which Korea’s image as a
puppet of China, a weakling unable to fend for itself, emerged.26) When it was
juxtaposed with the perception of Korea as representing Japan’s susceptibility, it
provided Meiji oligarchs with the justification that a “divine” Japan had every right to
exploit Korea for the safety of the Far East in general, and Japan in particular.27)
The Discursive Construction of Korean Petulance
Korea is a crucial node in the defense of Japan, given the prospect of encroaching
western colonialism.  Hence, the resolution of the “Korean problem” by securing a
foothold on the Korean peninsula became a primary objective for the nascent Meiji
government.28) It began by attempting to re-establish diplomatic relations with Korea.
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Until the Restoration, diplomatic intercourse between the two governments was
conducted via the Tsushima clan, with the Shogunate in Edo having no direct contact
with Seoul.29) In an effort at instigating direct relations with Korea, Tokyo dispatched a
communication from Emperor Meiji outlining the government’s intention to open
direct diplomatic channel.  However, to the dismay of Japanese leaders, Korea rejected
the communication on the grounds that the seal of the Japanese emperor was
illegitimate and could not be recognised, arguing that the term “emperor” was reserved
for China, and Japan had no business designating its sovereign as such.30) The Korean
Court saw it as Japanese audacity to use a title reserved for Chinese emperors; but for
the Japanese government, the Korean rejection was seen as its arrogance in rejecting a
friendly overture from an emperor whose divine ancestry mythologically derives from
the Sun Goddess.
The accreditation incident was a significant embarrassment for the Japanese
government.  Foreign Ministry service officer, Sada Hakuchi, noted in 1870 that
Korean actions represented its “arrogance towards Japanese benevolence.”31) The
Foreign Ministry memo circulated in April 1870 spoke of Korean “rudeness” and
concluded that “Korea, as a backward country and lacking in resources,” must accept
Japanese emperor’s credentials; otherwise a failure to comply will compel Japan to “ply
open” Korea.32) Kido Takayoshi, a junior imperial councillor, called Korea arrogant,33)
and in his letter to a Court Noble, Iwakura Tomomi, he wrote that “if the Koreans did
not acknowledge the error of their ways, Japan should condemn them publicly and
launch an attack to establish influence in Korea.” 34) These narratives discursively
construct a petulant Korean Other in relation to a righteous Japanese Self, whose
divine sincerity was rebuffed in an inauspicious act of Korean indolence.  This
unfortunate incident only hardened Japanese resolve to right the wrongs.
The perceived imperative to preserve Japanese sense of dignity following the
humiliation provided an impetus for the emergence of seikan-ron by 1873.35) I shall not
dwell on the details of the seikan-ron debate, but it is crucial to point out that the debate
was borne of Japanese frustration with Korea, as well as a by-product of domestic
political settlement in the immediate post-Restoration era.36) The outcome of the debate
solidified Japanese leaders’ collective image of Korea —— by showing the outside world
that Japan was intent on being a major player on the international stage, even if the
ramifications of its ambition were uncertain.37) In other words, the debate constituted
an important juncture in Japan’s speech-act, since the series of events in these post-
Restoration years elaborated a Japanese sense of Self in relation to the petulant Korean
Other.  As Marlene Mayo notes, “there had been much pressure both within the
government and from outside, 1868-1873, to punish the Koreans for refusing to accept
the official greeting of the Emperor and to acknowledge the change from Shogunal to
imperial rule,”38) and that the debate was not whether Japan should or should not send
expedition forces to Korea, but when.39) Following the debate in February 1874, Home
Minister Okubo Toshimichi and Finance Minister Okuma Shigenobu circulated a
memo to the cabinet reiterating Korean rudeness and that a punishment be meted
out.40) It became an opportune moment for Meiji oligarchs to realize Japan’s newly
established identity as an exceptional example of an Asian nation fending for itself.
The punishment eventually materialised in the form of Kanghwa Incident in 1875.
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Korean Other as An Object of Desire
The period between the Kanghwa Incident of 1875 and the Annexation of Korea in
1910 was the formative decades of Japanese identity, aspiring to become an Asian
Great Power, a fete realized gradually through defeating both China and Russia in
1895 and 1905, respectively.  At the same time, it elaborated on the collective prewar
Japanese identity of divine entity whose duty was to liberate Asia from western
encroachment.  Yet, pan-Asianism had an inherent condescension towards Asia,
representing it as an embodiment of backwardness.  In effect, the Incident was
tantamount to Japan’s speech act which sought to reconstruct a worldview through
which the Korean Otherness became an object of desire, both as a necessity for Japan’s
autonomy, and for Asia to fully realize its spiritual integrity.  In short, Kanghwa was the
performative manifestation of its understanding of the international environment.
Physically, the Kanghwa Incident (see below) marked Japan’s ascendance on to the
continent.  Metaphorically, too, it became a commemoration of Japan’s confidence in
dealing with Asian neighbors.  Hence, it was not only a moment of Japan’s first
diplomatic victory,41) but it precipitated a long process of emergence and elaboration of
Japanese prewar identity construction.
Taming the Korean “Other”
The perceived arrogance of Koreans following the accreditation incident and the
prospect of western powers mauling China made it an imperative for Japanese
government to tame Korea —— a duty bestowed upon the only Asian power morally
equipped to undertake such task.  Prior to the seikan-ron debate, the Foreign Ministry
reported in 1870 that: (1) Japan must open trade relations with Korea; (2) if the
overture is rejected, military actions should then be sanctioned; and (3) Korea must
also be “civilised” and “freed” from Chinese influence.42) Despite the decision not to
invade, the resolution of the seikan-ron debate in 1873 provided the rationale for putting
the above idea into practice.  In September 1875, a Japanese warship, Unyo, moored off
the island of Kanghwa near Seoul, where a small contingent left the ship on a boat
towards the shores of the island, ostensibly to ask for a supply of drinking water.  After
it came under fired from the Koreans, the Japanese navy launched a counterattack and
secured control of the island.  Japan promptly demanded reparations and treaty ports
to be opened as part of compensation.  In essence, while Japan was still obligated
under its own unequal treaties with the West, it demanded and obtained similar
obligations from the Koreans.  The Treaty of Kanghwa was signed the following year in
1876.  The Preamble reaffirmed the will of “The Governments of Japan and Chosen
[Korea], being desirous to resume the amicable relations of yore that existed between
them, and to promote the friendly feeling of both nations to a still firmer basis...”43)
With the Treaty, Japan sought to establish its moral legitimacy; and suggested to the
outside world that Tokyo was intent on joining the ranks of Great Powers.  As
Moriyama Shigeki observes, the irony of Japan’s unequal treaties with the West
cohabitating with its own against Korea marked a juncture in which Japan altered its
non-interventionist stance to a more interventionist one.44)
Peter Duus notes that the Kanghwa Treaty marked a “major change in relations with
Korea.”45) Coinciding with the signing of the Treaty, Enomoto Takeaki circulated a
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memorandum within the Foreign Ministry on 10 February 1876 arguing that, as a most
immediate passage into and from Asia, Korea was both a “political and strategic
necessity” whose security is not only crucial for Japan’s own but for the well being of
Asia as a whole.  As the weakest link, Enomoto stressed that Japan must station
diplomatic agents and increase its influence on Korea.46) Japan’s sense of vulnerability
was soon amplified by shared anxiety among the Meiji oligarchs over the perceived
weakness of Korea.  Being perceived in Tokyo as a puppet of an already weakened
China, Meiji government felt that Korea was left dangerously vulnerable to
colonialism; and since the consensus was that Korea would not be able to secure
autonomy on its own, Japan had no choice but to intervene on the peninsula.47) Yet,
this anxiety also presented an opportune moment for the reaffirmation of Japanese
identity as an exceptional nation.  Japan’s potential strength was constructed in
opposition to a weak Korean Other.  It was only a matter of time before Japan’s gaze
turned on Korea as an object of desire —— much more than a nation needing to be
disciplined.
While the late 1870s saw Japan being propelled on to the international stage by
making its first inroads into the continent, the next decade saw Japan steadily increase
its influence over Korea and slowly decimate its sovereignty.  The Meiji government
initially demanded Korean domestic reforms in a hope that it would strengthen the
kingdom.  In September 1882, Inoue Kowashi circulated a memorandum in the
cabinet in which he described Korea as weak and barbaric, and argued that for the
foreseeable future Korea would never be able to gain independence.  He added:
If Korea falls into the western hands —— just as India and Indonesia did —— it will
be as if a sword is suspended over our heads ... And if Russia takes hold of Korea,
that would upset the balance of power in Asia.  Hence for Asia’s sake, Japan and
China must cooperate to maintain Korean autonomy and prevent southward
invasion by Russia.48)
Inoue’s call for Japan to cooperate with China over Korea illustrates Tokyo’s concern
that a further weakening of China might precipitate a domino effect in Northeast Asia.
In an earlier memorandum, Inoue urged his fellow countrymen to enter into some
form of an agreement with China, the United States, the United Kingdom and
Germany to secure Korean “neutrality”—— a status similar to Belgium and Switzerland.
He further suggested that Korea be maintained as a protectorate, not as a puppet, of
China.  Inoue sought to pretend that Korea was free of Chinese influence, ameliorating
the likelihood of Korea collapsing into the hands of the West once China imploded.49)
Japan’s obsession with Korean autonomy eventually led to the Treaty of Tientsing
with China in 1885, following the failed Kapsin coup masterminded with Japanese
backing.  The two agreed on a “hands-off” approach towards Korea in an effort at
“divert[ing] both parties towards less troublesome methods of pressing their policies.”50)
The failed coup encouraged China to enhance its interventionist policy in Korea,
thereby increasing the prospect of a head-on collision with Japan.51) The significance of
the Treaty from the Japanese perspective, however, was that it allowed Japan to deploy
troops on Korean soil.  Moreover, the Treaty established Japan as China’s equal.52) Its
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status as a co-equal with China was psychologically significant for the Tokyo
government, since it signalled to the outside world that Japan was fully independent of
Chinese influence.  In the minds of the Meiji oligarchs, the Treaty was a proclamation
of Japan’s status as an independent state in Asia capable of asserting its autonomy and
interests, even if at first, the failed coup attempt had an undesirable effect of increasing
the chances of direct conflict with China.
Developments throughout the 1880s on Korea coincided with the drafting of the
Meiji Constitution.  This was the decade when, domestically, Meiji oligarchs were
consolidating their power by turning kokutai into a national ideology via the
promulgation of both the 1889 Constitution and 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education.  It
amplified the familial-state imaginary and the idea of Japan as a divine nation.
Domestic components of kokutai fed into the government’s perception of the
international environment, boosting the image of Korea as “weak” and “barbaric.”
With it, the “protection” of Korea became an imperative for Japan: the “weak” Korea
was called upon to reform itself, and Japan’s expansion into the peninsula was designed
to provide advice to that end.  When kokutai was directed outside Japan, it became the
underlying principle upon which the colonization of Asia became the means to counter
foreign pressure for the benefit of Japan and Asia in general.53) However, Japanese
“assistance” was insufficient to accelerate the pace of “reform” that Tokyo had
anticipated.  These failures added to Tokyo’s sense of frustration, and engendered a
countervailing sense of urgency in making sure Korea was sufficiently inoculated from
western encroachment.54)
By the beginning of the 1890s, Tokyo became increasingly restive with the slow pace
of Korean reforms.  The further weakening of China added to the anxieties that, unless
more fundamental changes were implemented in Korea, the peninsula’s independence
would became untenable.  Its sluggish pace helped buttress the image of Korea as
hopelessly weak and backward.  Inoue Kaoru, as a minister to Korea in March 1895,
called for “fundamental reforms” without which he thought Korea would remain an
“easy prey, leaving Japan’s flanks dangerously exposed.”55) The Sino-Japanese War of
1894-95 was an explicit ploy by Japan to wrest influence of Korea away from Chinese
control.  Japan’s victory in the War meant China ceased to be Japan’s hypothetical
enemy, only to be replaced by Russia.  There was a psychological significance too: now
that China was out of the way, Japan gained more room to expand its influence over
Korea without intervention from Beijing.56) Immediately after the Sino-Japanese War in
October 1895, Japanese sympathisers (helped by Japanese troops) assassinated Queen
Min in an effort at accelerating the reform process.
China’s defeat introduced further changes in Japanese speech-acts.  Now that one of
the impediments to Korean reforms, as Japan saw it, had been dispensed with, Japan
turned its attention to another threat to Korean independence, and hence Japanese
security —— Russia.  Since cooperation with China in “civilizing” Korea became
irrelevant now that China proved to be too weak to be of any use to Japan —— it felt
alone in fending for itself against western powers in “protecting” Korea.  In April 1903,
Yamagata, Ito, Katsura Taro and Komura Jutaro met in Kyoto to reaffirm Japanese
stance towards Korea in light of an imminent war with Russia.  The four agreed that
“however difficult the situation might become, Korea must never be let go.”57) With
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perceived threat from the West gathering momentum by the day, Japan believed itself
to be the only civilized nation in Asia, duty-bound to secure Korean independence.
Seen in this context, the Russo-Japanese War —— another contest over the dominance of
Korea —— was similar in scope to the Sino-Japanese War fought ten years before.  But
this time round, the symbolism was more profound.
Dissolution of the Korean Otherness
Duus argues that the early Japanese incursions into Korea should not be interpreted
as representing Japanese desire solely to “assert Japanese political control over the
peninsula or to acquire territory there.”58) Even after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895,
Japan insisted on Korean “independence,” vis-à-vis China, and it was not until after the
beginning of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 that outright annexation became an
option.  It was not until Japan found its previous policy of minimum interference
frustratingly inadequate that its occupation of Korea came to be seen as a necessary
evil, something a weakling like Korea had to endure in order to maintain stability in
Asia, given that great powers were poised to make inroads into Manchuria; and that
Japan felt even more threatened by the prospect of western colonizers knocking on its
doors.  In the end, a diplomatic necessity fused with Japan’s self-professed role to
reconstruct a conceptual milieu which made Annexation look inevitable.59)
Immediately following the start of the War on 23 February 1904, Japan signed a
Protocol requiring the Korean government to seek advice and consent from Japan on
diplomatic, as well as military, affairs.  Article 1 of the Protocol stated that the aim of
the agreement was to “foster peace” in the Far East; and in Article 3, Japan pledged to
guarantee Korean “independence” and “respect its territory.”60) It was a significant step
towards attaining exactly the opposite effect from the Treaty of Tientsing signed in
1885: now that Japan had no obligation towards China in respecting Korea as its
traditional sphere of influence, Japan granted itself free rein to intervene in Korea in
the name of restoring order in the Far East.  Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese
War and the Treaty of Portsmouth signed on 5 September 1905 further elaborated on
the Japanese liberationist identity.61) This was a moment the Japanese government had
been waiting for: it was recognized as an Asian Great Power, boosting Tokyo’s
confidence as the true liberator of Far East.  In other words, having reconstructed both
the Korean, as well as Western, Other, Japan had finally come to bask in the comfort of
a secure sense of Self.
Deciding that the Protocol alone was inadequate in congealing the sacrosanct Self,
Tokyo proceeded to strip diplomatic rights from Korea and placed it under its full
protection in the Protectorate Treaty (the Japanese-Korean Convention) signed on 17
November 1905.  It was seen by the Meiji government as a necessary step towards the
maintenance of peace and order in Asia.  Ito Hirobumi’s letter of accreditation stated
that the Treaty was “essential for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.”62) The
Protectorate Treaty established Japanese Residency-General —— in effect a Japanese
colonial government in Korea.  When Ito was appointed the first Resident-General, he
delivered a speech outlining Japan’s obligations towards Korea: “[i]f [reforms] are
neglected and no means devised for relieving it, [ Japanese] Empire will not only be
violating its responsibility as protector of Korea, but will also itself have to suffer in the
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end.”63) Ito’s deliberation represented Japan’s intention to proactively influence the
outcome of events on the peninsula.  The accelerated pace towards Annexation was the
very performance of Japan’s self-professed duty to liberate Asia.
While the Korean sovereignty was steadily eroding, some Japanese conservatives,
both inside and outside the government, felt frustrated at what they thought to be the
sluggish pace towards Annexation.  Conservative lobbyists with strong influence within
policy-circles, such as Uchida Ryohei, repeatedly assailed the government for its
reluctance towards outright annexation of the peninsula.  Uchida reminisced later, in
1932, that a faster Annexation would have been more beneficial to Japan since “unrest
in the Far East always had its roots in Korea.”64) Despite lobbying by conservatives, Ito
was cautious.  When Ogawa Heikichi urged him in 1907, he retorted that “since Korea
had a long history unlike Taiwan, rapid annexation of Korea would be
counterproductive.”65)
Ito maintained his cautious approach.  Initially, he sought to preserve a token
Korean independence, but he began to change his mind.  The cabinet of Prime
Minister Katsura Taro agreed on 6 July 1909 that the “Annexation was the long-term
goal of the imperial government.”66) This agreement came after Ito finally succumbed
to demands by Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro that annexation was the
only option available for resolving the “Korea problem.”  By now, the situation in
Korea looked “hopeless” in the eyes of Japanese leadership.  The reforms, they
thought, were too slow in coming, and the colonial government faced persistent
guerrilla attacks against Japanese interests on the peninsula.  Immediately before the
annexation, on 16 August 1910, Army General Terauchi Masatake, who succeeded Ito
after his assassination,67) told the Korean prime minister that, “Japan had fought on
behalf of Korea and sacrificed many lives.  But the situation is such that Japan sees no
alternative but to unify the two countries in order to protect the Korean imperial
household and its people.”68) The Treaty of Annexation was “signed” on 22 August
1910.69) The preamble to the Treaty read that “The Emperor of Japan and the King of
Korea, in recognition of the close and friendly relations between the two countries,
have signed this Treaty to further well being and happiness, and to aspire for eternal
peace in the Far East.”70) Just 35 years since Japanese troops landed on the island of
Kanghwa, the sovereignty of Korea was liquidated in the name of its “protection” and
“security” of the Far East.
Hence, what started out rather slowly gathered momentum by the time Japan
defeated Russia and re-entered the world stage as a significant Asian power.  Japan’s
national interest in securing a foothold on the continent, given its threat perception, is
evident here; but at the same time, Japanese identity as a divinely exceptional nation,
duty-bound to liberate the rest of Asia provided “grammar” with which to justify such
national interest.  In other words, Japan’s annexation of Korea was a performative
reaffirmation of its self-professed role.  It is with such an intersubjective frame of
reference that the characteristics of Japanese expansion into Korean peninsula can be
recast as one form of prewar identity representation.
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Conclusion
Re-reading the history of Japanese expansion into Korea as a speech-act of prewar
Japanese identity reveals that the Japanese sense of Self was constituted within an
incessant reconstruction of Korean Otherness —— from petulant and arrogant kingdom
that rejected Japan’s initial approach following the Meiji Restoration; the hopelessly
backward people whose vulnerability imperilled Japan’s security; to barbaric people
waiting to be disciplined into a respectable subject of a benevolent empire.  It is the
reconstruction of Korean otherness which reaffirmed Japan’s sense of divinity and
exceptionalism, and justified Tokyo’s policy of aggression against Korea in the name of
Asian “liberation.”71) In the process, Korea’s subject position in opposition to Japanese
sense of Self constantly kept on shifting between an object of concern and an object of
desire: “concern” because Japanese anxiety over Korean autonomy from China,
Russia, and the West in general, misconstrued Japan’s own sense of security; and
“desire,” since by taming the Korean Other, the Japanese Self was in turn realized.
The intersubjective shroud of Japanese liberationism provided a platform upon which
the sufferings of Koreans were forgotten, and allowed discipline to be substituted in
place of pain.  The inherent irony, of course, is that the liberation turned out to be
incarceration for Asia, and a proverbial seppuku for Japan.
The speech-act of Japan’s prewar identity representation enabled Tokyo to feel
comfortable enough in pressing ahead with its imperialist policy: the recurrent
persecution of insurgents —— both before and after the Annexation —— was repeatedly
reconstructed as necessary evil in taming the ungrateful and barbaric Koreans.72) At the
same time, the speech-act prevented Japan from empathizing with its colonial subjects:
even after the Annexation, Koreans never achieved the status as a “genuine” imperial
subject.  The dichotomy of Koreans as imperial subjects in practice cohabitated with the
notion of Korean Otherness within the empire as fundamentally distinct from Japanese
Self.73)
There was an irony in this speech-act.  That is, the more the Japanese tried to
discipline Koreans, the more its purported legitimacy was lost on the subjects, making
it an imperative —— in the eyes of the colonizers —— to discipline them further.74)
Perhaps, this irony is symptomatic of the contradictions inherent in the overall
Japanese imperial design: what was done in the name of the well being of Asia
exacerbated the seeds of conflict, forcing Japan to become embroiled in an intractable
position.  Within this conceptual quagmire, Japanese leadership lost track of the
Korean Otherness leading to the blurring of Japanese Self.  Japan paid dearly for this in
1945, and it is still paying-off the debt.
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